Wednesday, September 22, 2004
Colorado Rockies: Problems, Solutions, and the Hall of Fame
Section I: Problems and Solutions
While reading ESPN.com baseball writer and author Rob Neyer’s Big Book of Baseball Lineups, I happened upon the Colorado Rockies section. Rob’s book details every franchise’s all-time (two of them), all-rookie, single season, homegrown, traded-away, as well as the best and worst defensive teams. For Colorado, the lists are short all the way around. This is because they have only existed since 1993, which they cannot be faulted for. Some aspects of the teams are impressive, such as portions of the position players. The biggest problem lies within selecting their greatest pitchers ever. This is hard to do f or one reason: there is not much to choose from. There are one or two standouts (by Colorado standards) and everything else is basically those who survived the massacres of their seasons with most of their appendages still intact. It is also very tough to tell afterwards how good these pitchers actually are, mostly because Colorado affects the arms of those who pitch there. 180 innings pitched for the Rockies is like 200-210 innings pitched anywhere else. Not every pitcher is built to throw upwards of 210 innings per season, and that is why there are so many injured and ineffective pitchers there (besides the obvious problem with the air.) No pitcher ever stays with Colorado long enough for them to make any kind of serious impact anymore either.
At the moment, they have Jason Jennings, Joe Kennedy, and Shawn Estes in their rotation. Estes has had an ERA over 5.00 almost every year since his all-star in 1997. So when Estes posts an ERA over 5.00 (currently hovering around 5.80) in Colorado, shouldn’t the Rockies try and keep him instead of trying to put him on the trade block? Armando Reynoso is the only Rockies starter with two sub-5.00 ERA seasons, and those were 1993 and 1996, so they were not even back to back. He is cheap and he is pitching like the best of their pitchers of old, so why not round out the rotation with him? Jason Jennings posted a sub 5.00 ERA in his rookie season, winning 16 games. He struggled in 2003 but seems to have returned to form halfway through the 2004 campaign, even though his season numbers still look incredibly ugly. Joe Kennedy had a 3.95 ERA for the Rockies before going on the DL (3.46 for the season now.) That is an extremely rare occurrence, and if he can continue than they may have finally found someone who can pitch there well. Of course, this is a very small sample size, but the results seem positive for Colorado. So it seems that the Rockies have to shoot for a cheap rotation of homegrown pitchers and free agents who will be inexpensive as far as talented free agent pitching goes. This is tough to do, but as shown by 3/5 of their staff at the moment, progress is being made. They are trying, but the pitching is a tough thing to fix so patience is needed. This is common knowledge among those who care though, so this is not the point I am trying to get to. This is where the bullpen comes in.
For some reason, good pitchers in the Rockies bullpen who were good pitchers elsewhere, generally, seem to pitch well in Colorado as well. Steve Reed is the best example of this, and just may be the best pitcher they have ever had. He has returned there this season after a multiple season hiatus, and is pitching effectively again. Before coming back to Colorado this season he had a 3.68 ERA in 329 appearances. This year he is sporting the lowest ERA on the team, along with Tim Harrikala who also has a low ERA from the pen. This should tell the Rockies something, but it does not seem to. Building up an effective bullpen might be the secret to the Rockies pitching success. This is another topic that Neyer brought up but did not answer. He asked, “Is the bullpen more important for the Rockies, because their starters get knocked out so early often? Or is it less important, because the Rockies don’t play as many close games as does a typical team?” I believe the answer to this is that the bullpen is more important, as evidenced by the Rockies sole playoff campaign in 1995, where the starters were nothing much to write home about whereas four members of the bullpen combined for a 2.83 ERA in 283 innings pitched. Neyer says, and I agree, that this may have been one of the greatest bullpens of all time. Is it a coincidence that one of the years the Rockies bullpen and lineup were strong and their rotation the weak link they made the playoffs? I would like to think it is not. Everyone raves about the Rockies ability to score runs, but it is entirely off of the reputation they earned prior to Todd Helton’s entrance into the big leagues. Helton and Larry Walker are the only truly great hitters on that team, and Helton is the only one (ever) to be brought up through the Rockies’ system. Walker is usually injured for a quarter of the season though, so he is not as dependable as some may like. Preston Wilson put up great numbers last year but he is expensive and it was a career year. He has hit nearly as many homeruns in the past as he did last year, but there were a few seasons in between those. Also, he hit .260/.316/.479 on the road. Yuck. Jay Payton was surprisingly a staple of the offense last year, but Dan O’Dowd non-tendered him and he went off to San Diego, where pitcher friendly Petco Park has basically molested his ability to hit the ball with any semblance of authority. God bless their management’s genius. For Colorado, Payton hit .281/.330/.483 on the road. Not anything amazingly special, but when Preston Wilson is making $12.5 million per season and hitting worse you have no rights to complain. So the Rockies let him loose of course. On paper it looks like a good move since he is struggling this year, but he went from the best hitter’s park in the league to what appears to be one of the most severe pitcher’s parks in the league. As of this writing, the Padres have hit 60 homeruns as a team. With Brian Giles, Ryan Klesko and Phil Nevin in their lineup mind you. Not to mention Mark Loretta has developed into a possible 20 HR threat. So I still blame Colorado. (Note: San Diego’s players have adapted to their park and improved their offense greatly, but it still rates as the top pitcher’s park in the league this season.)
The bullpen needs to be bolstered, especially in the closer’s role, where Chacon is making progress towards a WHIP (Walks + Hits Per Inning) of 2.00. That’s what you want in a closer, a guy who can make save opportunities out of a blowout. The lineup looks horrendous, because people like Royce Clayton get overpaid to play good defense and hit nothing. Of course, guys like Clayton and Charles Johnson, who is playing catcher, started the season hitting very well, so unless you look at some splits you might not see how horrendous they actually are hitting. The Rockies really need to start taking a look at ways to improve their lineup. By improve I mean really improve; not sign some veteran who you hope one of your fans remembers from the past for ticket purposes so he can hit O.K. at Denver while hitting so poorly on the road you may be able to arrest him on charges of theft for agreeing to your contract offer and actually accepting his paycheck. Larry Walker is going to retire soon, which will bode both terribly and great for Colorado, depending on how they handle it. What happens when a guy who has won MVP’s and batting titles for many years retires? A huge sum of money returns to your lap for your spending pleasure. Now if they spend it on the lineup and the bullpen and just basically use the 1995 approach to starting (find every available veteran who doesn’t have any other options and throw him into the fire until he is charred) they may have something after awhile. (Note: Walker has since been traded to the St. Louis Cardinals, and the Rockies received virtually nothing in return. Well the bodies were warm I guess, so that constitutes something.)
They have one of the best home records in baseball consistently year to year. So what they have been doing is building a team solely for their home park while complaining about having to do that. What they need to do, instead of finding less than average hitters who will hit way above their career averages at Coors while continuing to be less than average hitters on the road, is find hitters who are actual hitters who can perform on both home and road. Of course there will be a discrepancy, but if the .240 hitter can hit .280, what will the .280 hitter do? The wallets need to be opened, like they were for Hampton and Neagle. I won’t even get into that discussion, its too embarrassing for all of those concerned. Its just that the amount of money thrown at two pitchers who have pitched more for other teams than you in the time since you signed them while your lineup deteriorates could have been used more effectively on something else. Anything else. Hampton is understandable; he was a sinkerball pitcher and coming off a few great seasons. He pitched like a kid who had just been brought up to the majors from tee-ball after his first couple of starts. It may have been entirely in his head after one bad start, but we will never know. The important thing to take from this is the guy you committed $121 million to over 8 years pitched just as poorly, if not more poorly, than the people you spent close to nothing on. I hate to use Darryl Kile as an example since he is recently deceased, but he is another example. One of my favorite ballplayers, and another former Astrodome star pitcher, his career took a downward spiral immediately upon entrance to Coors. He was traded to St. Louis and won the Cy Young. I don’t think I should have to say more on this subject. The hitting and bullpen need to be shored up, seriously. Forget the starting; star pitchers will struggle on the road after dealing with Coors no matter who you sign, so you might as well sign the cheap veteran and the kids. Also, its not so much the name of the pitcher that you bring in, but it may just be the assortment of pitches he throws, more on that later.
After some leafing through pitching statistics, it seems as if the Rockies basically wasted a valiant effort at home last year, as the team posted a cumulative ERA of 5.07; just what the head honchos in Denver should be looking for out of home. They did not succeed on the road as much though, with a 5.35 team ERA. Very odd, considering that Coors is the hitter’s park. It is well known (and documented somewhere I am sure) that Rockies’ pitchers, even those who were effective on other teams, struggle on the road (Mike Hampton again is the greatest bust…I mean example for this). Usually though, the ERA’s are not as bad on the road, just bad on an average scale. 2002 was more predictable, with a 5.47 home ERA to go along with a 4.92 road ERA.
Of course, with the offenses the Rockies had in previous years, they may have had a chance to go somewhere with those “low” ERA’s. Of course, they don’t have a lineup anymore, as previously discussed. It is not a stretch in anyway to say that the Rockies may need to score 1,000 runs to make the playoffs. Also, putting up the best home record in baseball with a .500 road record might get them in. If they strike quickly in the free agent market and gain the pieces they need, they may be able to succeed in the short run and re-generate interest in the team that formerly set attendance records in its “hey-day”. Do you know who has the second longest sellout streak in the history of baseball? Yeah its Colorado (way behind Cleveland though.) The Diamondbacks are old and do not have enough of a minor league system to field a winning team immediately, the Giants will someday be without Barry Bonds, and the Padres are a team with a great farm system, new ball park, and a good lineup that is missing some pieces and may just miss out on the playoffs this year. The Dodgers may be a legitimate team at the moment, but they have some aging pieces as well as a high payroll. Paul DePodesta, former assistant GM to Billy Beane in Oakland, should be able to keep that team in contention until he leaves, so that may be the biggest competition if Colorado is able to turn around at all. (Note: Dodgers washed away some payroll and added some youth at the deadline, yay Paul DePodesta.)
One last idea before I close off this section. The Rockies believe that sinkerball pitchers are going to be the ones who are most effective in the high altitude. I gave it some thought and started wondering if sidearm and submarine pitchers might have even more of an impact. The way they throw all of their pitchers have that natural sinking motion to them, and many induce ground-ball outs as well. I only have a few examples for this, but luckily one of them is the best pitcher they have ever had, and “a better candidate to pitch forever than Jesse Orosco” says Baseball Prospectus. Steve Reed has a career ERA somewhere in the low to mid 3.00’s for Colorado, and succeeds year in and year out for them. He is a sidearm pitcher, so one point for Marc’s theory. This could just be a coincidence, but apparently Dan O’Dowd hasn’t read Moneyball, or he did not take anything away from it. I got to thinking about the section on Chad Bradford, and how in the Canadian Rocky mountains he dropped his arm angle even lower and the ball sank even more. It was not just because of the arm drop, it also had to do with the fact that the air was being used to his advantage. The sinking motion of the balls he threw kept hitters from putting any real sky power on his pitches. Here are Bradford’s numbers from that park, as shown in Moneyball: “In a ballpark built for sluggers, he pitched fifty-one innings with an earned run average of 1.94, and gave up only three home runs.” It also states that, “As miserable as the Canadian Rockies were for most pitchers, they might as well have been created for Chad Bradford to pitch in.” So this is obviously not my idea, I am just stating that I cannot believe the Rockies have not tried to get more pitchers like this and show them that the air will actually help their career numbers. How about trying to steal Byung Hyun Kim from the Red Sox? They obviously are not using him, and since his performance has been down you can probably force them to swallow the price tag whole. If BK busts, you didn't pay for it. If he doesn't, not only did you not pay for it, but damnit, your on to somethig good. As far as the sinkerballers go, they might need to just get better ones without going overboard on the price tag. For example, Derek Lowe is having a terrible season for the Red Sox this year, but his only dominating performance came in Coors. Seven shutout innings, and he will probably be at a discount price. (Note: Lowe has since dispatched the evil demon that consumed his soul through the first half and put up a good, not spectacular second half…he is leading the league in groundball to flyball ratio at somewhere around 3:1.) Scott Boras is his agent though, so the Rockies should drop out of that bidding when he gets too rich for their blood. That is unless they think they really need an ace. That could be the one thing they need, is to have one losing streak stopper along with four cheaper pitchers. Lowe, Kennedy (who has a 3.46 ERA as of today, sparkling in general for his price), Estes (6 figures, can’t go wrong), Jennings (has had two terrible months that have ruined his ERA for the season, honestly he has not been that bad though), and insert $500,000 name tag here. With a rebuilt lineup, that is a team that might do something. Getting Chad Bradford from the A’s might not hurt either.
I decided to throw Jenning’s splits so you know just what I mean, only the ERA and WHIP though.
April: 10.52 / 2.10
May: 4.75 / 1.56
June: 4.75 / 1.81
July: 4.81 / 1.75
August: 6.21 / 1.76
September: 3.86 / 1.44
So we can expect, in a consistent season, maybe an ERA of sub-5 with a pretty unimpressive WHIP, but beggars can’t be choosey I guess.
While reading ESPN.com baseball writer and author Rob Neyer’s Big Book of Baseball Lineups, I happened upon the Colorado Rockies section. Rob’s book details every franchise’s all-time (two of them), all-rookie, single season, homegrown, traded-away, as well as the best and worst defensive teams. For Colorado, the lists are short all the way around. This is because they have only existed since 1993, which they cannot be faulted for. Some aspects of the teams are impressive, such as portions of the position players. The biggest problem lies within selecting their greatest pitchers ever. This is hard to do f or one reason: there is not much to choose from. There are one or two standouts (by Colorado standards) and everything else is basically those who survived the massacres of their seasons with most of their appendages still intact. It is also very tough to tell afterwards how good these pitchers actually are, mostly because Colorado affects the arms of those who pitch there. 180 innings pitched for the Rockies is like 200-210 innings pitched anywhere else. Not every pitcher is built to throw upwards of 210 innings per season, and that is why there are so many injured and ineffective pitchers there (besides the obvious problem with the air.) No pitcher ever stays with Colorado long enough for them to make any kind of serious impact anymore either.
At the moment, they have Jason Jennings, Joe Kennedy, and Shawn Estes in their rotation. Estes has had an ERA over 5.00 almost every year since his all-star in 1997. So when Estes posts an ERA over 5.00 (currently hovering around 5.80) in Colorado, shouldn’t the Rockies try and keep him instead of trying to put him on the trade block? Armando Reynoso is the only Rockies starter with two sub-5.00 ERA seasons, and those were 1993 and 1996, so they were not even back to back. He is cheap and he is pitching like the best of their pitchers of old, so why not round out the rotation with him? Jason Jennings posted a sub 5.00 ERA in his rookie season, winning 16 games. He struggled in 2003 but seems to have returned to form halfway through the 2004 campaign, even though his season numbers still look incredibly ugly. Joe Kennedy had a 3.95 ERA for the Rockies before going on the DL (3.46 for the season now.) That is an extremely rare occurrence, and if he can continue than they may have finally found someone who can pitch there well. Of course, this is a very small sample size, but the results seem positive for Colorado. So it seems that the Rockies have to shoot for a cheap rotation of homegrown pitchers and free agents who will be inexpensive as far as talented free agent pitching goes. This is tough to do, but as shown by 3/5 of their staff at the moment, progress is being made. They are trying, but the pitching is a tough thing to fix so patience is needed. This is common knowledge among those who care though, so this is not the point I am trying to get to. This is where the bullpen comes in.
For some reason, good pitchers in the Rockies bullpen who were good pitchers elsewhere, generally, seem to pitch well in Colorado as well. Steve Reed is the best example of this, and just may be the best pitcher they have ever had. He has returned there this season after a multiple season hiatus, and is pitching effectively again. Before coming back to Colorado this season he had a 3.68 ERA in 329 appearances. This year he is sporting the lowest ERA on the team, along with Tim Harrikala who also has a low ERA from the pen. This should tell the Rockies something, but it does not seem to. Building up an effective bullpen might be the secret to the Rockies pitching success. This is another topic that Neyer brought up but did not answer. He asked, “Is the bullpen more important for the Rockies, because their starters get knocked out so early often? Or is it less important, because the Rockies don’t play as many close games as does a typical team?” I believe the answer to this is that the bullpen is more important, as evidenced by the Rockies sole playoff campaign in 1995, where the starters were nothing much to write home about whereas four members of the bullpen combined for a 2.83 ERA in 283 innings pitched. Neyer says, and I agree, that this may have been one of the greatest bullpens of all time. Is it a coincidence that one of the years the Rockies bullpen and lineup were strong and their rotation the weak link they made the playoffs? I would like to think it is not. Everyone raves about the Rockies ability to score runs, but it is entirely off of the reputation they earned prior to Todd Helton’s entrance into the big leagues. Helton and Larry Walker are the only truly great hitters on that team, and Helton is the only one (ever) to be brought up through the Rockies’ system. Walker is usually injured for a quarter of the season though, so he is not as dependable as some may like. Preston Wilson put up great numbers last year but he is expensive and it was a career year. He has hit nearly as many homeruns in the past as he did last year, but there were a few seasons in between those. Also, he hit .260/.316/.479 on the road. Yuck. Jay Payton was surprisingly a staple of the offense last year, but Dan O’Dowd non-tendered him and he went off to San Diego, where pitcher friendly Petco Park has basically molested his ability to hit the ball with any semblance of authority. God bless their management’s genius. For Colorado, Payton hit .281/.330/.483 on the road. Not anything amazingly special, but when Preston Wilson is making $12.5 million per season and hitting worse you have no rights to complain. So the Rockies let him loose of course. On paper it looks like a good move since he is struggling this year, but he went from the best hitter’s park in the league to what appears to be one of the most severe pitcher’s parks in the league. As of this writing, the Padres have hit 60 homeruns as a team. With Brian Giles, Ryan Klesko and Phil Nevin in their lineup mind you. Not to mention Mark Loretta has developed into a possible 20 HR threat. So I still blame Colorado. (Note: San Diego’s players have adapted to their park and improved their offense greatly, but it still rates as the top pitcher’s park in the league this season.)
The bullpen needs to be bolstered, especially in the closer’s role, where Chacon is making progress towards a WHIP (Walks + Hits Per Inning) of 2.00. That’s what you want in a closer, a guy who can make save opportunities out of a blowout. The lineup looks horrendous, because people like Royce Clayton get overpaid to play good defense and hit nothing. Of course, guys like Clayton and Charles Johnson, who is playing catcher, started the season hitting very well, so unless you look at some splits you might not see how horrendous they actually are hitting. The Rockies really need to start taking a look at ways to improve their lineup. By improve I mean really improve; not sign some veteran who you hope one of your fans remembers from the past for ticket purposes so he can hit O.K. at Denver while hitting so poorly on the road you may be able to arrest him on charges of theft for agreeing to your contract offer and actually accepting his paycheck. Larry Walker is going to retire soon, which will bode both terribly and great for Colorado, depending on how they handle it. What happens when a guy who has won MVP’s and batting titles for many years retires? A huge sum of money returns to your lap for your spending pleasure. Now if they spend it on the lineup and the bullpen and just basically use the 1995 approach to starting (find every available veteran who doesn’t have any other options and throw him into the fire until he is charred) they may have something after awhile. (Note: Walker has since been traded to the St. Louis Cardinals, and the Rockies received virtually nothing in return. Well the bodies were warm I guess, so that constitutes something.)
They have one of the best home records in baseball consistently year to year. So what they have been doing is building a team solely for their home park while complaining about having to do that. What they need to do, instead of finding less than average hitters who will hit way above their career averages at Coors while continuing to be less than average hitters on the road, is find hitters who are actual hitters who can perform on both home and road. Of course there will be a discrepancy, but if the .240 hitter can hit .280, what will the .280 hitter do? The wallets need to be opened, like they were for Hampton and Neagle. I won’t even get into that discussion, its too embarrassing for all of those concerned. Its just that the amount of money thrown at two pitchers who have pitched more for other teams than you in the time since you signed them while your lineup deteriorates could have been used more effectively on something else. Anything else. Hampton is understandable; he was a sinkerball pitcher and coming off a few great seasons. He pitched like a kid who had just been brought up to the majors from tee-ball after his first couple of starts. It may have been entirely in his head after one bad start, but we will never know. The important thing to take from this is the guy you committed $121 million to over 8 years pitched just as poorly, if not more poorly, than the people you spent close to nothing on. I hate to use Darryl Kile as an example since he is recently deceased, but he is another example. One of my favorite ballplayers, and another former Astrodome star pitcher, his career took a downward spiral immediately upon entrance to Coors. He was traded to St. Louis and won the Cy Young. I don’t think I should have to say more on this subject. The hitting and bullpen need to be shored up, seriously. Forget the starting; star pitchers will struggle on the road after dealing with Coors no matter who you sign, so you might as well sign the cheap veteran and the kids. Also, its not so much the name of the pitcher that you bring in, but it may just be the assortment of pitches he throws, more on that later.
After some leafing through pitching statistics, it seems as if the Rockies basically wasted a valiant effort at home last year, as the team posted a cumulative ERA of 5.07; just what the head honchos in Denver should be looking for out of home. They did not succeed on the road as much though, with a 5.35 team ERA. Very odd, considering that Coors is the hitter’s park. It is well known (and documented somewhere I am sure) that Rockies’ pitchers, even those who were effective on other teams, struggle on the road (Mike Hampton again is the greatest bust…I mean example for this). Usually though, the ERA’s are not as bad on the road, just bad on an average scale. 2002 was more predictable, with a 5.47 home ERA to go along with a 4.92 road ERA.
Of course, with the offenses the Rockies had in previous years, they may have had a chance to go somewhere with those “low” ERA’s. Of course, they don’t have a lineup anymore, as previously discussed. It is not a stretch in anyway to say that the Rockies may need to score 1,000 runs to make the playoffs. Also, putting up the best home record in baseball with a .500 road record might get them in. If they strike quickly in the free agent market and gain the pieces they need, they may be able to succeed in the short run and re-generate interest in the team that formerly set attendance records in its “hey-day”. Do you know who has the second longest sellout streak in the history of baseball? Yeah its Colorado (way behind Cleveland though.) The Diamondbacks are old and do not have enough of a minor league system to field a winning team immediately, the Giants will someday be without Barry Bonds, and the Padres are a team with a great farm system, new ball park, and a good lineup that is missing some pieces and may just miss out on the playoffs this year. The Dodgers may be a legitimate team at the moment, but they have some aging pieces as well as a high payroll. Paul DePodesta, former assistant GM to Billy Beane in Oakland, should be able to keep that team in contention until he leaves, so that may be the biggest competition if Colorado is able to turn around at all. (Note: Dodgers washed away some payroll and added some youth at the deadline, yay Paul DePodesta.)
One last idea before I close off this section. The Rockies believe that sinkerball pitchers are going to be the ones who are most effective in the high altitude. I gave it some thought and started wondering if sidearm and submarine pitchers might have even more of an impact. The way they throw all of their pitchers have that natural sinking motion to them, and many induce ground-ball outs as well. I only have a few examples for this, but luckily one of them is the best pitcher they have ever had, and “a better candidate to pitch forever than Jesse Orosco” says Baseball Prospectus. Steve Reed has a career ERA somewhere in the low to mid 3.00’s for Colorado, and succeeds year in and year out for them. He is a sidearm pitcher, so one point for Marc’s theory. This could just be a coincidence, but apparently Dan O’Dowd hasn’t read Moneyball, or he did not take anything away from it. I got to thinking about the section on Chad Bradford, and how in the Canadian Rocky mountains he dropped his arm angle even lower and the ball sank even more. It was not just because of the arm drop, it also had to do with the fact that the air was being used to his advantage. The sinking motion of the balls he threw kept hitters from putting any real sky power on his pitches. Here are Bradford’s numbers from that park, as shown in Moneyball: “In a ballpark built for sluggers, he pitched fifty-one innings with an earned run average of 1.94, and gave up only three home runs.” It also states that, “As miserable as the Canadian Rockies were for most pitchers, they might as well have been created for Chad Bradford to pitch in.” So this is obviously not my idea, I am just stating that I cannot believe the Rockies have not tried to get more pitchers like this and show them that the air will actually help their career numbers. How about trying to steal Byung Hyun Kim from the Red Sox? They obviously are not using him, and since his performance has been down you can probably force them to swallow the price tag whole. If BK busts, you didn't pay for it. If he doesn't, not only did you not pay for it, but damnit, your on to somethig good. As far as the sinkerballers go, they might need to just get better ones without going overboard on the price tag. For example, Derek Lowe is having a terrible season for the Red Sox this year, but his only dominating performance came in Coors. Seven shutout innings, and he will probably be at a discount price. (Note: Lowe has since dispatched the evil demon that consumed his soul through the first half and put up a good, not spectacular second half…he is leading the league in groundball to flyball ratio at somewhere around 3:1.) Scott Boras is his agent though, so the Rockies should drop out of that bidding when he gets too rich for their blood. That is unless they think they really need an ace. That could be the one thing they need, is to have one losing streak stopper along with four cheaper pitchers. Lowe, Kennedy (who has a 3.46 ERA as of today, sparkling in general for his price), Estes (6 figures, can’t go wrong), Jennings (has had two terrible months that have ruined his ERA for the season, honestly he has not been that bad though), and insert $500,000 name tag here. With a rebuilt lineup, that is a team that might do something. Getting Chad Bradford from the A’s might not hurt either.
I decided to throw Jenning’s splits so you know just what I mean, only the ERA and WHIP though.
April: 10.52 / 2.10
May: 4.75 / 1.56
June: 4.75 / 1.81
July: 4.81 / 1.75
August: 6.21 / 1.76
September: 3.86 / 1.44
So we can expect, in a consistent season, maybe an ERA of sub-5 with a pretty unimpressive WHIP, but beggars can’t be choosey I guess.
Sunday, September 19, 2004
Section II: The Rockies Superstars
Section II: The Rockies SuperstarsI am basically using these four players so that pre-Coors, Coors, and post-Coors numbers can be analyzed. The four players are, in order of position: Andres Galarraga, (1B), Vinny Castilla (3B), Dante Bichette (LF), and Ellis Burks (CF). Next, I will present Castilla, Bichette, Galarraga and Burk’s career numbers unadjusted by team (well relevant numbers anyway; Castilla totaled 5 hits, 2 runs, and one RBI before coming over to Colorado in 2 years.)
(I know the stat table is shaky, I had to do it manually cause it wouldn't let me paste it from Microsoft Word.)
Vinny Castilla
Year Team AB HR
1993 COL 337 9 .255/.283/.404
1994 COL 130 3 .331/.357/.500
1991 MIL 445 15 .238/.272/.393
1992 MIL 387 5 .287/.318/.406
1993 COL 538 21 .310/.348/.526
1994 COL 484 27 .304/.334/.548
1995 COL 579 40 .340/.364/.620
1996 COL 633 31 .313/.359/.531
1997 COL 561 26 .308/.343/.510
1998 COL 662 22 .331/.357/.509
1999 COL 593 34 .298/.354/.541
2000 CIN 461 16 .295/.353/.466
2000 BOS 114 7 .289/.336/.518
2001 BOS 391 12 .286/.325/.460
Andres Galarraga
Year Team AB HR
1986 MON 321 10 .271/.338/.405
1987 MON 551 13 .305/.361/.459
1988 MON 609 29 .302./352/.540
1989 MON 572 23 .257/.327/.434
1990 MON 579 20 .256/.306/.409
1991 MON 375 9 .219/.268/.336
1992 STL 325 10 .243/.282/.391
1993 COL 470 22 .370/.403/.602
1994 COL 417 31 .319/.356/.592
1995 COL 554 31 .280/.331/.511
1996 COL 626 47 .304/.357/.601
1997 COL 600 41 .318/.389/.585
1998 ATL 555 44 .305/.397/.595
2000 ATL 494 28 .302/.369/.526
2001 TEX 243 10 .235/.310/.424
2001 SFG 156 7 .288/.351/.513
2002 MON 292 9 .260/.344/.394
2003 SFG 272 12 .301/.352/.489
Ellis Burks
Year Team AB HR
1987 BOS 558 20 .272/.324/.441
1988 BOS 540 18 .294/.367/.481
1989 BOS 399 12 .303/.365/.471
1990 BOS 588 21 .296/.349/.486
1991 BOS 474 14 .251/.314/.422
1992 BOS 235 8 .255/.327/.417
1993 CHW 499 17 .275/.352/.441
1994 COL 149 13 .322/.388/.678
1995 COL 278 14 .266/.359/.496
1996 COL 613 40 .344/.408/.639
1997 COL 424 32 .290/.363/.571
1998 COL 357 16 .286/.355/.510
1998 SFG 147 5 .306/.387/.463
1999 SFG 390 31 .282/.394/.569
2000 SFG 393 24 .344/.419/.606
2001 CLE 439 28 .280/.369/.542
2002 CLE 518 32 .301/.362/.541
2003 CLE 198 6 .263/.360/.419
All of their best years were in Coors, but in different amounts. Bichette had a dropoff in production, and his career ended 2 years later in Boston. Castilla is still playing, but is now back in Colorado. He had a few good seasons, but nothing compared to the one he is enjoying now in Colorado again (mysteriously huh?) Burks is the only one of the three who basically suffered no drop off at all; his biggest problem is actually his knees, as evidenced by his last full healthy season in 2002, where he continued to be a successful hitter at an advanced age. In fact, Burks’ 2000 season, if he had been healthy, would probably have far surpassed his 1996 campaign. Galarraga also enjoyed success after leaving Coors, but he was not quite the hitter he had been. This may be attributed to age though, because Big Cat was 37 when he joined Atlanta, and he is now a cancer survivor.
Basically, what is most evident is that Castilla did not turn into a great hitter immediately, he actually became one around the time he switched to third base. He had been playing shortstop before because Charlie Hayes was playing third and Castilla had not established himself as anything yet. When Castilla did leave though, he failed miserably for Tampa and brought his game back to respectability in Houston and Atlanta. This season is his best since leaving Colorado, so I guess we know that the park does indeed help him. Burks immediately became better than he had ever been, but he turned 29 in 1994 and continued hitting very successfully through age 37 in 2002, so this could also be attributed to a late breakout and extended prime. Galarraga’s career was revived in Colorado, and his most successful seasons were there, but he also had a late career breakout. Did Colorado give hitters such as Galarraga and Burks confidence they were missing to go along with their talent that seemed to be hibernating, but they were actually talented enough to continue their success in their post-Coors career? Bichette suffered a dropoff in production, but his can also be contributed to age. His 2001 campaign with Boston was only terrible if you are from around here, because we always look for scapegoats. He actually was not that bad (unless Kerrigan had him stealing, I think I went to two games at the end of the year where rallies were killed thanks to this tactic.) In reality it was not that bad, especially for a 37 year old. I don’t want to talk about Kerrigan as manager anymore because it hurts me spiritually.
To conclude with those four players, it seems that very talented hitters can continue their success elsewhere, basically making the effects of Coors on their career null and void. Except the effect is not, it did help them, it just did not harm them as much as less talented players. The really hard hit to the careers seems to be to the above average middle men, the Jeff Cirillo’s, the Jay Payton’s, and to take Vinny Castilla down from his pedestal, the Vinny Castilla’s. If you look closely there are many differences between the hitting of the other 3 Rockies’ stars and Castilla. Burks and Galarraga can in reality hit anywhere, and Bichette only had 18 less hits in his season after leaving Colorado. He had 11 less homeruns, but only 6 less doubles. Bichette was never consistent with his homerun totals though, as shown above, so this is another tough stat to read. Basically, Vinny Castilla is the only hardluck loser of the bunch. He returned to respectability in Houston, but that was in Minute Maid Park, which is a slight hitter’s park. I will analyze a few additional above average hitters now, to see if the differences in production are greater for players of this talent range.
I chose four players who could be considered B range who put in A production, or maybe they just played over their head and expectations. These five are Jeff Cirillo, Darryl Hamilton, Jeffrey Hammonds and Todd Hollandsworth. Four solid players through most of their careers (even though Hammonds could be described as solid glass) who reached their peaks in Colorado (no pun intended) and quickly dropped off the radar after their dismissal. We’ll start with Cirillo and Hamilton, as they are akin in a sense. Both were hitters who played better than they had ever before at Coors, even though it may not have been much better, but suffered large drop offs in production upon leaving. For Hamilton, the effects were not too harsh, as he actually succeeded immediately upon leaving Coors. After that though, his re-found double digit homerun power quickly fell back to a grand two year total of 2, with the last season also his worst average season since 1988. Hamilton’s career high in homeruns was 9, which he did in 1993 in Milwaukee. The next season he hit 1. If you look closely at his season by season totals, there really is no rhyme or reason to those numbers. One good indicator is that in 1998 he went from the Giants to the Rockies. In 97 games with San Fran, he hit 1 dinger. In 51 games with the Rox, he hit 5 and hit at .335, well above the .294 he had with the Giants. But just so Darryl Hamilton can make what I am saying more difficult, he chose to do the same type of midseason swap feat again, this time involving the Mets. He hit 4 homers in 91 games with Colorado, and 5 in 55 Mets games. He also hit 36 points better, hitting at a .339 clip, but this could also be attributed to having less time to mess it up. The next season though, at age 35, it looked as if time had caught up with Hamilton. His average dropped to .276, homerun totals went back down to 1, and he had 6 RBI’s in 43 games. The next season was uglier average wise, as he now fell to .214, but the rest of the stats remained just as pitiful. So what might we be able to pull from this, besides the fact that the Mets overpay veterans and ruin careers? Well that is what I am going to say with Jeff Cirillo, but let us get in the mindset that Coors might possibly slow down the effects of time on hitters, extending their careers. Remember Vinny Castilla is hitting once again, and Jeromy Burnitz is hitting well above the Mendoza line for the first time in a few years. So here is Cirillo in two three-year intervals:
Jeff Cirillo: 1998-2000
Year Team AB 2B HR AVG OBP SLG TB
1998 MIL 604 31 14 .321 .402 .445 269
1999 MIL 607 35 15 .326 .401 .461 280
2000 COL 598 53 11 .326 .392 .477 285
Not too shabby, looks like everything stayed around the same except the 18 extra doubles. That is a lot of doubles. The OBP dipped by 9 points, but that can happen sometimes. Or at least that is what you say until it does this from 2001-2003:
Year Team AB 2B HR AVG OBP SLG TB
2001 COL 528 26 17 .312 .364 .473 250
2002 SEA 485 20 6 .249 .301 .328 159
2003 SEA 258 11 2 .205 .284 .271 70
Well maybe 2001 is just an offseason right? He had 70 less at bats, but that doesn’t account for 27 less doubles. Doubles fluke in 2000? Maybe. Until you realize in 1996 and 1997 he hit 46 doubles. So there was already a drop in that stat as he fell to 31 in 1998. Was Cirillo slowly falling apart before our eyes as we thought of how good he may be? What is most alarming is the walk rate drop. In 2003 he seems to have learned how to walk again, but he forgot how to hit. Well Marc, it isn’t fair to show him go from the best hitter’s park in baseball to the one that Griffey and ARod complained about hurting their numbers before they played in it. Maybe it is just that. Well I cannot show a rebound since he has gone to San Diego and does not play full time, but I can get the home and away splits for Cirillo in 2000 and 2001 to see if there was a decline in production away from home:
Jeff Cirillo, 2000
Venue AB 2B HR AVG OBP SLG
Home 318 36 9 .403 .472 .607
Away 280 17 2 .239 .299 .329
Jeff Cirillo, 2001
Venue AB 2B HR AVG OBP SLG
Home 254 18 9 .362 .404 .571
Away 274 8 8 .266 .383 .383
To be completely honest I pulled Jeff Cirillo out of my head 15 minutes before I started writing this section, and after analyzing the above stats I went to see the home and away splits. I had no idea it was that bad. I basically have decided that besides the falling OBP, you can look at his falling doubles totals year by year. His average remained basically around the same area before 2002, so it may be that in those last two seasons in Milwaukee where his doubles totals dropped by 15 that they just started turning into singles. Then when he got into Colorado the singles turned back into doubles. Then in 2001 he even started failing to perform at home (compared to his 2000 numbers anyways). This shows just how much a hitter can enhance his totals at Coors, and also shows that the Rockies need to be more careful with who they sign. No one saw it coming with Cirillo because he looked like an up and coming star, and the fact that his RBI totals remained about equal at home and on the road really probably didn’t alert anyone to badly of the performance. Too bad Seattle didn’t notice. So Hamilton’s case could be Coors hiding his age, while Cirillo’s is Coors hiding his failing talent. Baseball Prospectus 2004 says, “In 1997-1999, Jeff Cirillo was pretty much the same ballplayer as Bill Mueller in 2003 (Mueller won the batting title.)” So they obviously (since its what they do) analyzed the situation with the same thinking except probably using complex formulas and techniques I don’t have at my disposal at the moment.
I do not want to get into too much detail with these other two players, but their best seasons were both in Colorado (I sense a recurring theme.) Jeffrey Hammonds basically breaks down every season and provides some good offense when he isn’t hurt. He didn’t hurt himself in Colorado, he revived his career, left for a big paycheck, and broke down again. Todd Hollandsworth was a career Los Angeles player until he came to Coors, and his cumulative average in 2000-2002 (he only played in 189 games in 3 seasons, then he was traded to Texas, where he didn’t excel) was .317. One of those seasons included a .368 average though. He hit .234 in 81 games for LA in 2000 and in 56 games for Colorado the same year he hit .323. With the power and average he appeared to be developing he was starting to look like more than a B player, and I did abuse his tenure at Coors on my fantasy team, then dealt him almost immediately upon his trade to Texas. So considering the effects of Coors on the 3 players we labeled A-type compared to those who we have labeled B-type (including Vinny Castilla) we can see that it seems those with more talent in general thrive in Colorado but also hit on the road very well, not as well as at home but they still hit. They can also continue to hit outside of Colorado, as shown by Burks and Galarraga and to a lesser extent Dante Bichette. B-types seem to fall off of the planet almost immediately after. Some of them rebound (Hollandsworth is hitting .318 with 8 HR’s in part-time action for the Cubs this year, he was also hurt) and others not so much (Cirillo is just happy to be on someone’s payroll.)
(I know the stat table is shaky, I had to do it manually cause it wouldn't let me paste it from Microsoft Word.)
Vinny Castilla
Year Team AB HR
1993 COL 337 9 .255/.283/.404
1994 COL 130 3 .331/.357/.500
1995 COL 527 32 .309/.347/.564
1996 COL 629 30 .304/.343/.548
1997 COL 612 40 .304/.356/.547
1998 COL 645 46 .319/.362/.589
1999 COL 615 33 .275/.331/.478
2000 TAM 331 6 .221/.254/.308
2001 TAM 93 2 .215/.247/.344
2001 HOU 445 23 .270/.320/.492
2002 ATL 543 12 .232/.268/.348
2003 ATL 542 22 .277/.310/.461
2004 COL 539 33 .275/.336/.549
Dante Bichette
Dante Bichette
Year Team AB HR
1990 CAL 349 15 .255/.292/.4331991 MIL 445 15 .238/.272/.393
1992 MIL 387 5 .287/.318/.406
1993 COL 538 21 .310/.348/.526
1994 COL 484 27 .304/.334/.548
1995 COL 579 40 .340/.364/.620
1996 COL 633 31 .313/.359/.531
1997 COL 561 26 .308/.343/.510
1998 COL 662 22 .331/.357/.509
1999 COL 593 34 .298/.354/.541
2000 CIN 461 16 .295/.353/.466
2000 BOS 114 7 .289/.336/.518
2001 BOS 391 12 .286/.325/.460
Andres Galarraga
Year Team AB HR
1986 MON 321 10 .271/.338/.405
1987 MON 551 13 .305/.361/.459
1988 MON 609 29 .302./352/.540
1989 MON 572 23 .257/.327/.434
1990 MON 579 20 .256/.306/.409
1991 MON 375 9 .219/.268/.336
1992 STL 325 10 .243/.282/.391
1993 COL 470 22 .370/.403/.602
1994 COL 417 31 .319/.356/.592
1995 COL 554 31 .280/.331/.511
1996 COL 626 47 .304/.357/.601
1997 COL 600 41 .318/.389/.585
1998 ATL 555 44 .305/.397/.595
2000 ATL 494 28 .302/.369/.526
2001 TEX 243 10 .235/.310/.424
2001 SFG 156 7 .288/.351/.513
2002 MON 292 9 .260/.344/.394
2003 SFG 272 12 .301/.352/.489
Ellis Burks
Year Team AB HR
1987 BOS 558 20 .272/.324/.441
1988 BOS 540 18 .294/.367/.481
1989 BOS 399 12 .303/.365/.471
1990 BOS 588 21 .296/.349/.486
1991 BOS 474 14 .251/.314/.422
1992 BOS 235 8 .255/.327/.417
1993 CHW 499 17 .275/.352/.441
1994 COL 149 13 .322/.388/.678
1995 COL 278 14 .266/.359/.496
1996 COL 613 40 .344/.408/.639
1997 COL 424 32 .290/.363/.571
1998 COL 357 16 .286/.355/.510
1998 SFG 147 5 .306/.387/.463
1999 SFG 390 31 .282/.394/.569
2000 SFG 393 24 .344/.419/.606
2001 CLE 439 28 .280/.369/.542
2002 CLE 518 32 .301/.362/.541
2003 CLE 198 6 .263/.360/.419
All of their best years were in Coors, but in different amounts. Bichette had a dropoff in production, and his career ended 2 years later in Boston. Castilla is still playing, but is now back in Colorado. He had a few good seasons, but nothing compared to the one he is enjoying now in Colorado again (mysteriously huh?) Burks is the only one of the three who basically suffered no drop off at all; his biggest problem is actually his knees, as evidenced by his last full healthy season in 2002, where he continued to be a successful hitter at an advanced age. In fact, Burks’ 2000 season, if he had been healthy, would probably have far surpassed his 1996 campaign. Galarraga also enjoyed success after leaving Coors, but he was not quite the hitter he had been. This may be attributed to age though, because Big Cat was 37 when he joined Atlanta, and he is now a cancer survivor.
Basically, what is most evident is that Castilla did not turn into a great hitter immediately, he actually became one around the time he switched to third base. He had been playing shortstop before because Charlie Hayes was playing third and Castilla had not established himself as anything yet. When Castilla did leave though, he failed miserably for Tampa and brought his game back to respectability in Houston and Atlanta. This season is his best since leaving Colorado, so I guess we know that the park does indeed help him. Burks immediately became better than he had ever been, but he turned 29 in 1994 and continued hitting very successfully through age 37 in 2002, so this could also be attributed to a late breakout and extended prime. Galarraga’s career was revived in Colorado, and his most successful seasons were there, but he also had a late career breakout. Did Colorado give hitters such as Galarraga and Burks confidence they were missing to go along with their talent that seemed to be hibernating, but they were actually talented enough to continue their success in their post-Coors career? Bichette suffered a dropoff in production, but his can also be contributed to age. His 2001 campaign with Boston was only terrible if you are from around here, because we always look for scapegoats. He actually was not that bad (unless Kerrigan had him stealing, I think I went to two games at the end of the year where rallies were killed thanks to this tactic.) In reality it was not that bad, especially for a 37 year old. I don’t want to talk about Kerrigan as manager anymore because it hurts me spiritually.
To conclude with those four players, it seems that very talented hitters can continue their success elsewhere, basically making the effects of Coors on their career null and void. Except the effect is not, it did help them, it just did not harm them as much as less talented players. The really hard hit to the careers seems to be to the above average middle men, the Jeff Cirillo’s, the Jay Payton’s, and to take Vinny Castilla down from his pedestal, the Vinny Castilla’s. If you look closely there are many differences between the hitting of the other 3 Rockies’ stars and Castilla. Burks and Galarraga can in reality hit anywhere, and Bichette only had 18 less hits in his season after leaving Colorado. He had 11 less homeruns, but only 6 less doubles. Bichette was never consistent with his homerun totals though, as shown above, so this is another tough stat to read. Basically, Vinny Castilla is the only hardluck loser of the bunch. He returned to respectability in Houston, but that was in Minute Maid Park, which is a slight hitter’s park. I will analyze a few additional above average hitters now, to see if the differences in production are greater for players of this talent range.
I chose four players who could be considered B range who put in A production, or maybe they just played over their head and expectations. These five are Jeff Cirillo, Darryl Hamilton, Jeffrey Hammonds and Todd Hollandsworth. Four solid players through most of their careers (even though Hammonds could be described as solid glass) who reached their peaks in Colorado (no pun intended) and quickly dropped off the radar after their dismissal. We’ll start with Cirillo and Hamilton, as they are akin in a sense. Both were hitters who played better than they had ever before at Coors, even though it may not have been much better, but suffered large drop offs in production upon leaving. For Hamilton, the effects were not too harsh, as he actually succeeded immediately upon leaving Coors. After that though, his re-found double digit homerun power quickly fell back to a grand two year total of 2, with the last season also his worst average season since 1988. Hamilton’s career high in homeruns was 9, which he did in 1993 in Milwaukee. The next season he hit 1. If you look closely at his season by season totals, there really is no rhyme or reason to those numbers. One good indicator is that in 1998 he went from the Giants to the Rockies. In 97 games with San Fran, he hit 1 dinger. In 51 games with the Rox, he hit 5 and hit at .335, well above the .294 he had with the Giants. But just so Darryl Hamilton can make what I am saying more difficult, he chose to do the same type of midseason swap feat again, this time involving the Mets. He hit 4 homers in 91 games with Colorado, and 5 in 55 Mets games. He also hit 36 points better, hitting at a .339 clip, but this could also be attributed to having less time to mess it up. The next season though, at age 35, it looked as if time had caught up with Hamilton. His average dropped to .276, homerun totals went back down to 1, and he had 6 RBI’s in 43 games. The next season was uglier average wise, as he now fell to .214, but the rest of the stats remained just as pitiful. So what might we be able to pull from this, besides the fact that the Mets overpay veterans and ruin careers? Well that is what I am going to say with Jeff Cirillo, but let us get in the mindset that Coors might possibly slow down the effects of time on hitters, extending their careers. Remember Vinny Castilla is hitting once again, and Jeromy Burnitz is hitting well above the Mendoza line for the first time in a few years. So here is Cirillo in two three-year intervals:
Jeff Cirillo: 1998-2000
Year Team AB 2B HR AVG OBP SLG TB
1998 MIL 604 31 14 .321 .402 .445 269
1999 MIL 607 35 15 .326 .401 .461 280
2000 COL 598 53 11 .326 .392 .477 285
Not too shabby, looks like everything stayed around the same except the 18 extra doubles. That is a lot of doubles. The OBP dipped by 9 points, but that can happen sometimes. Or at least that is what you say until it does this from 2001-2003:
Year Team AB 2B HR AVG OBP SLG TB
2001 COL 528 26 17 .312 .364 .473 250
2002 SEA 485 20 6 .249 .301 .328 159
2003 SEA 258 11 2 .205 .284 .271 70
Well maybe 2001 is just an offseason right? He had 70 less at bats, but that doesn’t account for 27 less doubles. Doubles fluke in 2000? Maybe. Until you realize in 1996 and 1997 he hit 46 doubles. So there was already a drop in that stat as he fell to 31 in 1998. Was Cirillo slowly falling apart before our eyes as we thought of how good he may be? What is most alarming is the walk rate drop. In 2003 he seems to have learned how to walk again, but he forgot how to hit. Well Marc, it isn’t fair to show him go from the best hitter’s park in baseball to the one that Griffey and ARod complained about hurting their numbers before they played in it. Maybe it is just that. Well I cannot show a rebound since he has gone to San Diego and does not play full time, but I can get the home and away splits for Cirillo in 2000 and 2001 to see if there was a decline in production away from home:
Jeff Cirillo, 2000
Venue AB 2B HR AVG OBP SLG
Home 318 36 9 .403 .472 .607
Away 280 17 2 .239 .299 .329
Jeff Cirillo, 2001
Venue AB 2B HR AVG OBP SLG
Home 254 18 9 .362 .404 .571
Away 274 8 8 .266 .383 .383
To be completely honest I pulled Jeff Cirillo out of my head 15 minutes before I started writing this section, and after analyzing the above stats I went to see the home and away splits. I had no idea it was that bad. I basically have decided that besides the falling OBP, you can look at his falling doubles totals year by year. His average remained basically around the same area before 2002, so it may be that in those last two seasons in Milwaukee where his doubles totals dropped by 15 that they just started turning into singles. Then when he got into Colorado the singles turned back into doubles. Then in 2001 he even started failing to perform at home (compared to his 2000 numbers anyways). This shows just how much a hitter can enhance his totals at Coors, and also shows that the Rockies need to be more careful with who they sign. No one saw it coming with Cirillo because he looked like an up and coming star, and the fact that his RBI totals remained about equal at home and on the road really probably didn’t alert anyone to badly of the performance. Too bad Seattle didn’t notice. So Hamilton’s case could be Coors hiding his age, while Cirillo’s is Coors hiding his failing talent. Baseball Prospectus 2004 says, “In 1997-1999, Jeff Cirillo was pretty much the same ballplayer as Bill Mueller in 2003 (Mueller won the batting title.)” So they obviously (since its what they do) analyzed the situation with the same thinking except probably using complex formulas and techniques I don’t have at my disposal at the moment.
I do not want to get into too much detail with these other two players, but their best seasons were both in Colorado (I sense a recurring theme.) Jeffrey Hammonds basically breaks down every season and provides some good offense when he isn’t hurt. He didn’t hurt himself in Colorado, he revived his career, left for a big paycheck, and broke down again. Todd Hollandsworth was a career Los Angeles player until he came to Coors, and his cumulative average in 2000-2002 (he only played in 189 games in 3 seasons, then he was traded to Texas, where he didn’t excel) was .317. One of those seasons included a .368 average though. He hit .234 in 81 games for LA in 2000 and in 56 games for Colorado the same year he hit .323. With the power and average he appeared to be developing he was starting to look like more than a B player, and I did abuse his tenure at Coors on my fantasy team, then dealt him almost immediately upon his trade to Texas. So considering the effects of Coors on the 3 players we labeled A-type compared to those who we have labeled B-type (including Vinny Castilla) we can see that it seems those with more talent in general thrive in Colorado but also hit on the road very well, not as well as at home but they still hit. They can also continue to hit outside of Colorado, as shown by Burks and Galarraga and to a lesser extent Dante Bichette. B-types seem to fall off of the planet almost immediately after. Some of them rebound (Hollandsworth is hitting .318 with 8 HR’s in part-time action for the Cubs this year, he was also hurt) and others not so much (Cirillo is just happy to be on someone’s payroll.)
Saturday, September 11, 2004
Section III: The Rockies and the Hall of Fame
This brings me to Todd Helton and Larry Walker. Neyer does not believe that Walker should be considered a Hall of Famer because he has only played 150 games in a season once, statistics notwithstanding (Coors affected, but I will get to that.) I am more on the plane of thought that if he plays 130 games a year and puts up the numbers he does than why not let him in? Kirby Puckett was allowed in on the basis that he would have padded his career totals enough to make his entrance ring true, even though his best years were behind him. Obviously Puckett and Walker’s situations are different, as Puckett simply could not play any longer, but it may not be Walker’s fault that he is a fragile man either. He is a fragile man that can swing a bat, and at some point some Rockie will have to make the Hall….right? That man may be Todd Helton, but if there is a big debate over whether or not Walker can get in based on not just his injury problems but also his altitude affected stats than just enough of the voting committee might be swayed in the wrong direction for the future. Helton still has a long way to go, but he is more than halfway to 400 homers and if you hit over .320 for your career I’m sure that will do (he is sitting at .337 as of now.) Helton hit .358 last year, second for the batting title. Did a few of his hits come thanks to Coors? Of course they did. But Baseball Prospectus has his equivalent batting average (EqBA) at .340. If you look at his last 3 seasons with his unadjusted stats and his adjusted stats next to them, you will obviously see a difference. Is the difference big enough to keep him out of the Hall (if he keeps it up)? I hope not.
Year AVG OBP SLG EQBA EQOBP EQSLG
2001 .336 .432 .685 .314 .413 .642
2002 .329 .429 .577 .310 .415 .552
2003 .358 .458 .630 .340 .445 .602
2004 .347 .469 .620 .321 .447 .572
Year AVG OBP SLG EQBA EQOBP EQSLG
2001 .336 .432 .685 .314 .413 .642
2002 .329 .429 .577 .310 .415 .552
2003 .358 .458 .630 .340 .445 .602
2004 .347 .469 .620 .321 .447 .572
I’d take the line to the right anytime, any of those years. The worst season Helton had a back injury that sapped his homerun power, and he still slugged .552. The adjustment is not enough to be backbreaking, but Helton is just that talented. Not to mention the fact that he can play first base with anyone else in the league. He still has a ways to go though, so we will see how he does when he is 30 years old next season. As for Larry Walker, minus last season, his adjusted numbers are very impressive. Looking back, you might think last season was the beginning of the end for Walker, but he has come back strong in 2004 once he returned from the DL. I actually went out and got the park factors from Baseball-Reference.com so that I could adjust Walker’s Rockies seasons to look at everything from a year by year perspective of what it is he has actually done. The man probably has a few seasons left in him, and 400 homers is only 32 off as of me typing this. Not to mention that his career average is above .300, as well as a career slugging percentage of .567. Neyer says that there are 18 retired players with a career slugging of .534 or over, and all of them are in the Hall. Walker might have just distanced himself far enough away from that mark to enter the Hall in the future. We won’t know until then though, so if you like him keep your fingers crossed on another two productive seasons.
(Note: Walker has hit .280/.393/.560 this season for St. Louis in 48 games, compared to .324/.464/.630 in Denver...a difference yes, but he is still slugging .560, and that may be enough. Luckily, Walker also played very well in the playoffs for St. Louis, giving him some more national exposure.) Oh yeah, and he has 8 Gold Gloves.
